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Foreword
On June 26 and 27 2009, an international seminar entitled “Dokto,
Takeshima, Liancourt Rocks : Rethinking Territorial Disputes in East
Asia” was held at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS, organized by The
John Hopkins University SAIS Korea Studies Program. The seminar was
composed of four panel discussions where issues related to Takeshima/
Dokto were taken up from broad perspectives. Nine Koreans or Korean
Americans, three Japanese and three Americans were selected as
panelists, and in addition nine American scholars joined these panels as
discussants. This paper was discussed at the afternoon session of Friday
June 26, entitled “Takeshima in Japan” chaired by Professor Soon Won
Park of George Mason University. The author tried to explain the rich
experience of the territorial negotiations between Japan and Russia, and
argued that Japan-Korea territorial disputes on Takeshima/Dokto can
borrow from this rich experience so that ultimately Japan and Korea might
build up confidence building measures that were built between Japan and
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Russia. The author presented a vision of peace and cooperation around the
islands as an ultimate vision for the two countries. In authorʼs recollection,
this idea was met with unexpected favorable responses not only by
American participants but also by Koren or Korean American participants.
The paper was first presented to the conference organizers dated June 18,
and after the conference was revised and sent again to the organizers
dated September 25 2009. Having four years passed since then, it
goes without saying that so many things have occurred over the
Takeshima/Dokto issue as well as over other territorial issues in East
China Sea. Some of the points written in this paper are overtaken by
events since September 2009. But the author considers that, although
some aspects of territorial disputes require more careful writing, the main
thoughts developed here still stand true, and so, rather than trying to
rewrite it from the perspectives of October 6 2013, when this “Foreword”
is added, he preferred to publish it in the form it was drafted four years ago.
All texts below date back to 2009, except purely copyediting revisions.
Introduction
Japan is currently engaged in three territorial issues : Northern
territories, Takeshima and Senkaku. On each issue, the position of respec-
tive government regarding the fundamental issue of the sovereignty
entirely differ each other. This paper does not enter into, nor does it aim
to cover, the vast area of historical and legal righteousness of each
governmentʼs position regarding the sovereignty issue. Once a position is
taken and fixated on territorial issue, it becomes extremely difficult for any
government to change its position. Holding negotiations is already creating
fundamental difficulty. If the positions of the two sides are radically apart,
then particularly the party, which actually controls the contested territory
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may easily reject holding the negotiations. Such was the case with the
Soviet Union during the Cold War in particular from 1978 until 1986. Such
is the case for the Korean Government on Dokto and for the Japanese
Government on Senkaku. Even if the negotiations are accepted, it is
usually extremely difficult for any government to acknowledge that its own
historical views or legal views over the contested territory proved to be
wrong.
This paper concentrates on different approach toward the territorial
issues which divide countries in Northeast Asia. The paper concentrates
on what can be loosely defined as “confidence building measures” sur-
rounding the territorial issue, different from the fundamental “sovereignty
issue” that divides respective countriesʼ position. Confidence building
measures can be loosely defined as, first, “concrete measures and
agreements” which are related to the territorial issue, but which do not
address the resolution of the sovereignty issue and helps developing the
confidence of the two diverging parties. The second area which may be
included in those confidence building measures are various type of
“dialogue and exchanges”, which do not aim and therefore do not entail
concrete agreement or measures, but which are intended to improve better
understanding on the dividing issue between respective countries.
Debates and resolutions in multilateral fora, which are to improve better
understanding but which do not have binding effect may be included in that
second category as well.
This paper starts by a general comparison of the three territorial issues
around Japan. It then draws on the rich experience of Japanese-
Soviet/Russian territorial negotiations and will analyze first how the two
areas of confidence building measures developed in the long period of
negotiations between the two countries. Then it will try to apply the
general conclusions drawn from that Russian/Soviet negotiations analysis
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to the two outstanding negotiations with China and Korea. The paper
ends with a short conclusion summarizing the lessons drawn from that
application.
General comparison of Japanʼs three territorial issues
Comparing with the Northern Territories with Russia
Territorial negotiations have always been at the centrality of bilateral
relations between Japan and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. In
cases of Takeshima and Senkaku, seen from Japanese perspectives, each
territorial negotiation has rarely been at the centrality of respective
bilateral relations, though with different reasons and different historical
background. This is the fundamental difference between the Russo-
Japanese relations and Korean/Chinese-Japanese relations.
Occupation of the four islands located at the South of the Kurile Islands
was for Japan the last vestige of WWII, the symbol of its victim
consciousness which it endured as the result of WWII. None of that victim
consciousness existed in relation to China and Korea, where the Japanese
fundamentally felt a sense of regret and apology for the aggression
committed in China and the colonial ruling committed in Korea.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1955-56 were done with a view of
settling all issues which resulted from Soviet attack to Japan from August
9, 1945. The territorial issue was one of the most serious issues for the
settlement of that negotiation. This became the only unresolved issue
which hampered the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Japanese position to
ask the return of four islands became crystallized then and since then did
not waver. In these Cold War days, the territorial issue became entangled
with power factors among Cold War adversaries. The Soviet Union agreed
to make limited concession in order to entice Japan to become more
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detached from the United Sates. Japan insisted as its minimal demand to
get back the four islands and did not mind exacerbation of relations with a
Cold War adversary. The territorial negotiations with the Soviet Union
played on the whole a useful role to preserve adversary relations between
the two countries. After the end of the Cold War when adversarial
relations did not serve best respective countriesʼ national interests, serious
efforts were made by both sides to improve bilateral relations. The
territorial issue naturally became the key issue to find a breakthrough and
it has always been at the center of the negotiations. Serious negotiations
started from 1985 when Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union.
Opportunities for a breakthrough were there, but they have been missed
one after the other : twice under Gorbachev in 1986-87 and 1988-89 ; twice
under Yeltsin in 1991-92 and 1997-98 ; and once under Putin in 2000-01.(1)
Present day bilateral relations might be facing a new window of
opportunity between Medvedev/Putin and Hatoyama, but, but whenever
some talks emerge for the improvement of the relationship, it is always the
territorial issue which is at stake.
Takeshima/Dokto with Korea
That situation is vastly different regarding Takeshima. Likewise the
Northern Territories, Takeshima was one of the serious issues which had
to be resolved in the 14 years of negotiations to establish diplomatic
relations between Japan and Korea. The negotiations became much
strained in the initial years after the end of WWII, partly because
Takeshima was incorporated within the Syngman Rhee line established in
1952. Numerous Japanese fishing boats were captured, fishermen detained
( 1 ) See Kazuhiko Togo, The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern
Territories : Five Lost Windows of Opportunity, (in Japanese, Tokyo, Shinchosha,
2007)
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and some of them died in captivity.(2) In July 1953 and August 1954,
Japanese Maritime Safety Agencyʼs vessel was shot by Korean border
guards.(3) In 1965, when Japan and Korea established diplomatic relations,
the Syngman Rhee line was abolished but the Takeshima/Dokto issue was
left completely unresolved. An Exchange of Notes concerning the
resolution of conflicts was concluded and since then the Japanese side
claims that the Takeshima issue has to be resolved through negotiations as
is prescribed in this Exchange of Notes and proposed that if the two sides
are not able to find a solution then the issue be transmitted to the scrutiny
of the International Court of Justice. From Japanʼs perspective, it was
recognized that the issue emerged when Japanʼs national power was at its
nadir after its total defeat, and when Japan was not expected to enter into
collision with South Korea as fellow spokes linked with the common hub of
the United States. The Korean side claimed that it never accepted to
negotiate the Takeshima issue, because there was no territorial issue
between Japan and Korea and it is axiomatic that there was nothing to take
up to the International Court of Justice. Forty four years have passed since
then. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Japanese side has
never brought up this issue to the centrality of bilateral relations. In the
official high-level diplomatic exchanges the Japanese side regularly raised
this issue, but it never went beyond the confirmation and reminder that
Japan has not relinquished its claim. The issue was “put on the shelf” at
least seen from the Japanese side.
( 2 ) Figures vary but Park Yuha gives the following : 230 vessels detained, three
sunk and 173 kept in Korea. 2791 fishermen detained and five died. Park Yuha,
Wakaino Tameni, (Tokyo, Heibonsha, 2006), p. 193. Japanese Wikipedia states
328 detained vessels, 3929 arrested fishermen, and 44 dead or injured (access
June 17, 2009).
( 3 ) http : //www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/g_senkyo.html (access June
16, 2009)
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Since the Japanese government has never given any official explanation
it may not be easy to detect that difference between the Northern
Territory and Takeshima, both of which the Japanese government claims
back. It is also not realistic to expect that the Japanese government gives
explanation as to why they lack political energy and determination to claim
back the Takeshima islands, because pro forma a 20th-21st century
government is not in a position to neglect its territorial claim. In my
personal view the best way to understand the cause of that fundamental
difference of perception between the Northern Territories and Takeshima
is that the Northern Territories is the unresolved issue to rectify Japanʼs
lost honor and pain it suffered during WWII. There is a national urge to do
something in order to heel the wound of the war. The issue goes deep into
the psychology of post-war Japanese, its injured sense of pride and lost
identity. Nothing of that sort existed in relations to Takeshima. To the
contrary there is a general recognition that Takeshima was negotiated in
the context of Korea having gained independence from 35 years of
annexation. If Northern territories is a symbolic issue to honor its lost
pride and identity under its victim consciousness, Takeshima has been
recognized as an issue which took shape when Korea was in the process of
overcoming its victim consciousness and Japan acknowledging its per-
petrator role. There is very little reason for Japan to claim the islands with
the same intensity as it is claiming the Northern Territories from the
Soviet Union.
Nevertheless Takeshima issue began to occupy a central role in bilateral
Japan-Korea relations recently. It is no exaggeration to say that the latter
part of Roh Moo-hyungʼs presidency from 2005 to 2007 was mostly spoilt by
the Dokto issue, as the result of Shimane prefectureʼs decision on March 16,
2005 to set the date of February 22 as the “Shimane Takeshima Day”.
President Rohʼs declaration of diplomatic war against Japan and populace
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anger reported through Korean media seemed to have no limit. As we see
below, possible collision of Japanese Maritime Security Agencyʼs research
vessel and Korean border guard vessels around Takeshima/Dokto in April
2006 nearly brought the two governments into physical skirmishes. Lee
Myung-bakʼs initial honeymoon period with Prime Minister Fukuda did not
really last more than a half year. This was due to the modification of the
commentary to the Monkasho Guidance of Teaching of junior-high school
textbook on Takeshima. The commentary indicated that this is an issue to
be taught at school, using a soft language which indicated that Korea had
its position as well. But Korean media as well as Leeʼs government reacted
sharply, and until the issue somehow calmed down in the autumn, it
became one of the central political issues between the two countries. Given
the fact that Japan and South Korea share many power factors as common
democracies and common allies to the United States, extreme emotionalism
displayed by the Korean side can only be explained from the historical
complexity of Japan-Korea relations.
Senkaku/Dyaoyutai with China
Senkaku is again an entirely different story. As a territorial issue for
post-war Japan the issue did not exist until the islands were claimed by the
Republic of China (Taiwan) on June 11, 1971 and by the Peopleʼs Republic
of China on December 30, 1971.(4) The islands did not constitute a part of
the Japanese territory under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
but was a part of the Nansei Shoto under Article 3 thereof put under the U.
S. administration.(5) It is widely interpreted that Chinese claims are done
after their growing interest on the oil reservoir, which became publicly
( 4 ) Kazuhiko Togo, Japanʼs Foreign Policy 1945-2003 : The Quest for a Proactive
Policy, Leiden, Brill, 2005, p. 136
( 5 ) http : //www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/area/senkaku (access June 7, 2009)
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known by a report issued by ECAFE in 1968. The islands were put under
Japanʼs effective control after the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was put into
force in May 1972. Despite the claim they made in December 1971, the
Chinese leaders explicitly stated that they have no intention to raise this
issue at the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan
and China in September 1972.(6) Both at the last stage negotiations on the
Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978(7) and at the occasion of the
exchange of the instruments of ratification in October 1978(8), Deng
Xiaoping expressed that the issue is better handled by the next generation.
( 6 ) Zhou Enlai stated on July 28, 1972 to the President of Komei Party,
Yoshikatsu Takeiri, the following in a preparatory meeting to pave the way of
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanakaʼs visit to China bin September to establish
diplomatic relations : “There is no need to touch the Dyaoyutai islands issue.
Chairman Takeiri presumably was not interested either. I was not interested
either, but historians became interested in it, particularly with regard to the oil
issue, and in Japan Professor Kiyoshi Inoue is very enthusiastic on this issue.
But vthere is no need to look at this issue with emphasis.” Akira Ishii et.
als, Nichukokko Seijyoka/Nichuheiwa Yukojyouyaku Teiketsukosho, (Tokyo,
Iwanami, 2003), p. 20
( 7 ) Chinese source later indicated that Deng stated to Sonoda, Japanese Foreign
minister who visited China to sign the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that “We
must not scrutinize this issue now. We have to leave it aside, later find time to
discuss, and find a way for mutually acceptable solution with time. If current
generation cannot find a solution then the next generation, or the generation
thereafter may find a way of solution.” Ishii et als, Nichukokko Seijyoka, p.
179-80
( 8 ) At the press conference in Tokyo on October 25, 1978 when Deng came to
Tokyo on the occasion of exchange of instruments of ratification, he made the
following statement to the Japanese press : “…We promised each other on the
occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations that we are not going to
discuss this issue…. On the occasion of the negotiations of the Treaty of Peace
and friendship, we both came to share the view that we are not going to discuss
this issue…. This matter can be left aside for sometime to come…. People in the
next generation is wise, so they may find the wisdom to solve it.” Tatsuo Urano,
Senkakushoto, Ryukyu, Chugoku, (Tokyo, Sanwa Shoseki, 2005), p. 248
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In a situation where Japan has effective control over the islands and where
Chinaʼs claim does not have any nature of urgent resolution through
negotiations or other means, there did not emerge an urgent need from the
Japanese side to resolve this issue bringing it to the centrality of the
relationship. Since then during the Cold War, the two governments
basically contributed to take cautious policy not to bring this issue to the
centrality of the relationship. Although on the Chinese side, given the
nature of communist party led political structure, the extent of the
involvement of the government and individuals remained “uncertain”.
Already in April 1978 in the leading months toward the conclusion of the
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 100 Chinese fishing vessels surrounded
the sea area around the islands, forty of them directly entering into the
territorial waters. It was explained as “accidental” at the Peace and
Friendship Treaty negotiations.(9)
With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Chinese economic, political
and military power, the situation began to change. In February 1992, at the
turning point of the wake of the Cold War, the Chinese government
established a new territorial water law, and prescribed formally that
Dyaoutai was a part of Chinese territory. Some Japanese observers began
to assert that Dengʼs policy to leave the solution to a later generation may
have ended on this point.(10) In the changing atmospherics of post-Cold
War, some Japanese Nationalist youth constructed a light house in July
1996. This was met by sharp protest by the Chinese government.
Demonstrations took place in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and Chinese
protesters from Hong Kong and Taiwan surrounded the islands. Japanese
Maritime Security Agency made efforts to maintain order without causing
( 9 ) Togo, Japanʼs Foreign Policy 1945-2003, p. 136
(10) Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Minamishinakaino Gasudenmondai”, Yomiuri Shimbun,
August 20, 2008.
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physical collision.(11) And then, against the background of rising political
tension caused by Koizumiʼs repeated visits to Yasukuni, seven Chinese
nationalist protesters went ashore of the islands in March 2004 resulting
into a swift compulsory deportation.(12) Last but not least, we have recently
observed that the Chinese government has adopted a more open policy of
involvement in Senkaku, completely dissociating itself from Dengʼs legacy.
The incident in December 2008 shows it as we see it below.
In total when one looks at current actual situation there are clear traces
of Japanese government policy to let Japanese involvement into the islands
to a minimum level almost taking a policy of “abandonment” of the
islands.(13) This is a heightened policy of pulling away the Senkaku islands
from the centrality of bilateral relations and strikes a sharp contrast to the
policy adopted by the Korean government on Dokto. Again because the
Japanese government would never acknowledge the existence of such
policy one can only speculate the reason of such policy. First, since the
islands are under Japanese control, so long as its actual governance is not
threatened by any other countryʼs physical force, fundamental position of
the Japanese government would be reasonably well secured. Second,
provoking China and in its corollary, Taiwan and Hong Kong may well be a
high price to pay from the point of view of power and security. It is not
worth it. Third, there may not be a prospect of tangible net benefit from
actual immediate involvement in Senkaku. Even if there were some, actual
(11) Yusuke Edo, Senkakushoto, (Tokyo, Koyu Shuppan, 1996), p. 14-16 ; Togo,
Japanʼs Foreign Policy 1945-2003, pp. 151-152
(12) Tadayoshi Murata, Senkakuretto Uotsurijimamondaiwo domiruka, (Tokyo,
Nihon Kyohosha, 2004), p. 4
(13) Recent situation in Senkaku where virtually Japanese citizensʼ access is shut
down is described in reportage by those “adventurists” who sought access to the
islands. Yasushi Nishimuta, Daremo Kokyowo Shiranai, (Tokyo, Jyohosenta
Shuppankyoku, 2008), pp. 327-374
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involvementʼs cost may be higher than otherwise.
In contrast to Japanese restraint, moves shown at the end of 2008 by the
Chinese side seemed to have gone clearly outside the framework of Deng
Xiaopingʼs legacy, not to put the issue of the reversion of Senkaku at the
centrality of the relationship. Why did China change its course and began
distancing itself from Dengʼs legacy? Several reasons may be pointed out :
first, obvious rise in Chinaʼs national power which required greater
manifestation of its presence throughout the world ; second, Chinaʼs need
for energy sources and Chinaʼs urge to maximize its control of all sea
resources around the Chinese continent ; third, rising military power,
particularly its naval power which self-evidently was requiring its greater
manifestation.
In total, as the result of Japanʼs concentration on the territorial issue with
the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, a paradoxical situation has emerged.
In the area where this paper intends to focus its analysis, that is the area of
confidence building measures in terms of concrete agreements and
exchanges there have accumulated vast knowledge and experience not to
make the territorial issue an immediate security danger for peace and
security in North East Asia. None of the equivalent experience has been
developed in relation to Takeshima and Senkaku, and consequently we now
see greater danger on security in Takeshima and Senkaku.
Concrete measures and agreements to build
confidence with Russia
During the Cold War
Already immediately after Soviet occupation of the four islands, there
emerged at least two issues which required concrete settlement. The first
issue was Kombu (tangle) fishing around the Kaigara island, which
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constitutes one island within the group of Habomai islands. Fishermen
whose life hold depended on the Kombu catch in the Kaigara island, after
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1956, exerted pressure to the
representatives of fishery business community and an agreement between
Japanʼs Fishery Association and Soviet State Fishery Committee was
concluded in 1963 to allow Japanese Kombu catch around Kaigara island.
This agreement was renewed yearly, except between 1977 and 1981 due to
the fishery talks related to the establishment of 200 miles economic zone as
described below.(14)
The second issue in question was the visit by the Japanese inhabitants of
four islands to the graveyard of their ancestors. After the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1956, former islanders who were deported in 1947 to
Hokkaido from the four islands asked very strongly that visits to ancestorsʼ
graveyards on the islands be permitted. Soviet side conceded to this
request and the first graveyard visit based on a simplified system of
certificate, rather than strict visa system based on Soviet border control
law took place in 1964. With certain interruption in 1968, 1971-1973, the
graveyards visit continued until 1974. But in 1975, the Soviet authority
requested the Japanese side to follow strictly Soviet border law and
implement grave yards visit based on ordinary visa system and upon
refusal by the Japanese side, graveyards visit discontinued for 10 years.(15)
One more issue loomed very heavily in the height of the Cold War. In
December 1976, the Soviet Union adopted a new law to demarcate its 200
miles fishery zone. In the Cabinet Decision as of February 1977 to
(14) http : //www.city.nemuro.hokkaido. jp/dcitynd.nsf/image/3f6be5587f5678aa
4925757d00104949/$FILE/%E8%B2%9D%E6%AE%BB%E6%98%86%E5%B8%8
3%E4%BA%A4%E6%B8%89%E3%80%90%E8%A8%82%E6%AD%A3%E3%80%
91.pdf (access, June 16, 2009)
(15) http : //www.hoppou.go. jp/event/to_graves/index.html (acess, June 16, 2000)
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implement this new law, a concrete line to demarcate Soviet border was
adopted, including an area to cover the waters around the four islands. The
Japanese side considered that acknowledging this line would mean
acknowledging Soviet unlawful jurisdiction. As a result of fierce nego-
tiations the Japanese side withdrew all fishery vessels from the Soviet 200
miles fishery zone and pressured for a compromise. The Soviet side
agreed to conclude a fishery agreement with a mitigating clause so that
this agreement would not affect any other issues than fishery.(16)
Post-Cold War confidence building measures
The timid accumulation of concrete agreements where reciprocal
compromise was expected in order to ensure confidence building began to
increase drastically from the time of the end of the Cold War.
The first sign of compromise began to take place after Foreign Minister
Shevardnadzeʼs visit to Tokyo in January 1986 and Shintaro Abeʼs visit to
Moscow in May 1986. After these two visits and clear convergence of
positions that graveyardsʼ visits have to be revived for humanitarian
purposes, the two governments exchanged a Note Verbal in July to resume
graveyards visit based on a simplified system of certificate. This practice
has been continuing since then.(17)
The second major achievement was made in October 1991 in establishing
a framework of “no visa visit”. Gorbachev visited Japan in April 1991, and
in the adopted communiqué it was agreed that “The Soviet side proposed
the enhancement of exchanges between the inhabitants of the above
mentioned [four] islands and Japanese nationals, establishment of
simplified system of no-visa visit by Japanese nationals to these islands,
initiation of mutually beneficial economic activities on the islands and that
(16) Togo, The Inside Story, pp. 95-97
(17) http : //www.hoppou.go. jp/event/to_graves/index.html (acess, June 16, 2000)
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measures to reduce Soviet armed forces deployed on the islands shall be
taken soon. The Japanese side stated that they would continue to discuss
these issues.”(18) No-visa agreement was concluded thus in October and
since then this practice has been continuing.(19)
The third agreement reached was concerning fishery in the territorial
waters around the four islands. Territorial waters around the four islands
were rich in fishery sources such as crab or sea urchin (uni), and Japanese
fishermen who traditionally made the catch continued their activities even
after the Soviet occupation. The Soviet border guards arrested these
fishermen and confiscated their boats and repeated incidents had become
incessant source of friction between the two countries. This situation was
aggravated particularly after the demise of the Soviet Union when Russian
border control became loose. Numbers of “unlawful trespassing and
catch”, in accordance with Russian definition, and the danger that the
arrest of these fishing boats may develop into physical violence augmented.
The two governments began negotiations to conclude an agreement to
govern Japanese catch in territorial waters around the four islands in
September 1994. The negotiations found a breakthrough in the spring of
1997, when the two sides found a way to overcome the sovereignty issue,
which proved to be the most difficult hurdle. The Russian basic position
was that these territorial waters were legal and legitimate Russian
territory, therefore, it should be clearly written in the agreement that
Japanese catch would be conducted in accordance with Russian law. The
Japanese basic position was that since this is a territory unlawfully
occupied by Russia, Japan cannot accept Russian jurisdiction. After
strenuous negotiations, a common meeting of minds emerged that under
(18) Gaimusho, Warerano Hopporyodo, Shiryohen, 2004, p. 38
(19) Gaimusho, Warerano Hopporyodo, 2004, p. 29-30
143(696)
the assumption that Russian law is actually applied in this area, the
agreement would be concluded without any mentioning of Russian
jurisdiction over the territorial waters concerned. The Japanese side will
voluntarily follow de facto rules which are implemented in the waters, and
the Russian authority would trust that this voluntary observation would be
actually implemented. This became the key concept of the agreement, and
a treaty to govern Japanese catch in the territorial waters around the four
islands was concluded in February 1998. One of the key Japanese nego-
tiators later told that “this is a unique treaty based on ʻtrustʼ rather than
ʻassumed distrustʼ which is a common basis of any international agree-
ment.”(20) Catches based on this fishery agreement has been implemented
orderly since then, except for one incident when in 2006, a Japanese fishing
boat was chased by Russian border guard for “illegal catch” and a
fisherman was shot dead by a Russian border guard.
The fourth agreement was on humanitarian assistance to the four
islands. This concept emerged after a severe earthquake shook Northern
Territories in 1994, and a framework agreement was reached along the line
of no-visa exchanges to implement humanitarian assistance related to
earthquake. This framework was enlarged in September 1998 to include
other humanitarian projects than earthquake, entitled as “emergency
humanitarian assistance based on no-visa system”. Since then enlarged
concept was applied and building of emergency lodging house, combined
with lodging space for Japanese visitors, was built in 1998 and a diesel
electricity facility was established in 2000. Since 2002, the scope of
humanitarian assistance was restricted to assistance which had real
emergency nature or medical assistance.(21) Recently, Russian side began
(20) Togo, The Inside Story, pp. 227-232
(21) Gaimusho, Warerano Hopporyodo, 2004, p. 30-31
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to object that even the medical assistance goes outside the framework of
emergency assistance, and the two sides are trying to find a solution.(22)
Thus with some turbulence, the scheme continues to be implemented to
this day.
The fifth, and probably the last scheme, which is implemented now is
what is called “free visits”. This idea was first raised, taking into account
the grievances expressed by former inhabitants of Habomai islands. Since
the basic structure of no-visa exchanges was that visitors from Japan have
to be received by responsible Russian organizations or individuals,
Habomai inhabitants fell under a vacuum because there was practically no
one living in Habomai islands after Russian occupation.(23) Prime Minister
Keizo Obuchi took up this issue in his talk with President Yeltsin in
November 1998 and an agreement to implement “free visits”, maximum
simplified scheme of former islandersʼ visits to the four islands, were
created in September 1999. Smooth implementation is ensured since
then.(24)
Bilateral dialogue and exchanges and multilateral exchanges
and negotiations on Northern Territories
Bilateral dialogue and exchanges
In the Cold War days, practically there was no dialogue on the territorial
issue among government officials, social activists and opinion leaders
between the two countries. Socialists, communists and leftists had their
own channel of dialogue. The Socialist Party had a more Russia friendly
approach and the Communist Party took a more independent approach on
(22) Sankei Shimbun, May 29, 2009
(23) Togo, The Inside Story, p. 262
(24) Gaimusho, Warerano Hopporyodo, 2004, pp. 31-32
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the territorial issue. But neither of them affected government policy. But
during the Cold War there was one exceptional channel which slowly
established a channel of dialogue among main stream opinion leaders of the
two countries. Ichiro Suetsugu, former member of pre-war Japanese
intelligence Service, Nakano Gakko, devoted his post-war life to Japanʼs
youth movement and the resolution of territorial issues, became the
pioneer of the non-governmental dialogue between the two countries.
After the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, he organized a group called the
Institute of Security Studies (Anzenhoshomondai Kenkyujyo, ANPOKEN),
gathered scholars of conservative-realists, established a channel with the
top Soviet think-tank, Institute of International Economics and Interna-
tional Relations (IMEMO) and began initiating a structural dialogue on
Japanese-Soviet relations, at the center of which lied the territorial issue.
This ANPOKEN-IMEMO dialogue, still continuing to this day, played a
vital role particularly in the 1970ʼs and 1980ʼs in enlarging the scope of
mutual understanding on the territorial issue between the two countries.
When Gorbachev came to power in 1985 and began his policy of
Perestroika and Glasnostj, free exchanges of views permeated Russian
society, and the territorial issue with Japan became no exception. But the
first sign of free debate appeared from the Japanese side in response to
Gorbachevʼs major political speech on Asia-Pacific Region made in
Vladjvostiok in 1986. Mineo Nakajima, a renowned China specialist, and
Haruki Wada, a long time specialist on Russia both voiced their views that
rigid assertion of the reversion of four islands in a bunch may not be
realistic and a more flexible approach to achieve the reversion in a gradual
manner may be realistic. But in the rapidly deteriorating political relations
between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1986-88, this Nakajima-Wada
contention was soon lost its saliency in the Japanese public debate.
Conversely, debates on the territorial issue emerged in Russian media in
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1988 and it reached to its peak in 1989 and 1990. Just to outline some of the
major writings in the Russian media would include : Kunadze-Sarkisovʼs
joint paper, which underlines the necessity of political will for the
resolution and of the adherence to the 1956 Joint Declaration (May
1989)(25), Academician Afanashievʼs statement in Tokyo that he ultimately
supports the reversion of four islands (October 1989)(26), eloquent journal
debates between Kunadze, Sarkisov, Lukin, and Tuyshetsky showing
several differing views to seek a breakthrough in Japanese-Soviet relations
(Aganyok,May 1990)(27), and Kunadzeʼs paper which underlined the moral
responsibility of observing 1956 Joint Declaration and ensuring negotia-
tions on Kunashiri and Etorofu (August 1990).(28) The Soviet govern-
mentʼs position at the time when these views emerged in the Russian press
did not formally change. But they constituted the basis of Russian thinking
in Gorbachevʼs visit to Japan in 1991 as well as Russian policy adopted by
Yeltsinʼs government in the first year after the failed coup in August 1991.
These public debates in Russia, and ensuing qualitatively deepened
dialogue among opinion leaders between the two countries, more than
anything else helped better understanding in the Japanese side what kind
of flexible approach might Russia take in order to find a breakthrough.
These debates found some echoes in Japanese policy measures taken in
Yeltsinʼs second presidency from 1996-1999 and Putinʼs first year of
negotiations with Prime Minister Mori in 2000-01.
(25) Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Hoporyodo Mondaito Nichirokankei, (Tokyo,
Chikumashobo, 2000), pp. 154-155
(26) Hasegawa, Hoporyodo, p. 164
(27) Hasegawa, Hoporyodo, p. 166
(28) Hasegawa, Hoporyodo, pp. 166-170
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Multilateral exchanges and negotiations
Frank, courageous and creative discussion in non-governmental circles
in respective country thus proved to be very useful in energizing the
territorial negotiations between Japan and Russia. Enlarging the scope of
debate to multilateral fora did not always have such an impact. So long as
the debate was confined within academic circle and conducted in scholarly
manner it could prove to be useful. A trilateral report by Graham Allison,
Hiroshi Kimura and Konstantin Sarkisov “Beyond Cold War to Trilateral
Cooperation in the Asia- Pacific Region : Scenarios for New Relationships
between Japan, Russia and the United States” presented to the three
governments in August 1992 was a commendable effort by academicians of
the three countries to recommend a new vision.(29) In-depth debates
among scholars and policy makers, all attending a conference and
submitting papers, which eventually took the form of a book Japan and
Russia : The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999(30) was another
example how academic debates and writing may contribute to a better
understanding among parties.
But when it comes to governmental multilateral debates, the matter
becomes highly sensitive and not necessarily constructive. Three G7
summitsʼ handling of Japanese-Soviet/Russian relations gives examples. In
July 1990 in Houston, when Europe was in a real turmoil after the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the rising tide toward the unification of Germany, Japanese
negotiators tried to ensure that this dramatic change should also take place
in Asia, notably in the context of Japanese-Soviet relations. The German
delegation insisted that provocative statement against Gorbechev should
(29) For this report, contact : Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, U. S. A.
(30) Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia, The Tourtuous Path to Normalixzation,
1949-1999, (New York, St. Martinʼs Press, 2000)
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be withheld, and no mention was made in the Political Declaration. But the
Japanese delegation succeeded in letting the chairman state that “we
expressed concern that in the Asia-Pacific region, we have not yet
observed reconciliation, military withdrawal and relaxation of tension
which characterized east-west relations in Europe. In this regard, we
support an early resolution of the Northern Territorial issue which is an
inevitable measure for the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations.”(31)
The inclusion of that statement was coincidentally accompanied by
Foreign Minister Nakayamaʼs statement later that “the assistance to the
Soviet Union was similar to damp the money into a ditch.” Soviet side
responded very negatively to these Japanese reactions, and many
additional efforts became needed to overcome the hardened state of
negotiations.(32)
But in July 1991 in London, the way Japanese delegation handled the
matter became much more subtle. Gorbachevʼs visit to Japan took place in
April of that year and there was a clear progress on the territorial problem.
This was the first G7 summit which invited Gorbachev in recognition to the
great change he introduced with his policy of Perestroika and new thinking
diplomacy. The line suggested by the Japanese delegation and accepted by
the G7 leaders in the Political Declaration reads as follows : “Our support to
the fundamental reform policy in the Soviet Union is firm. We believe that
the Soviet New Thinking in its foreign policy, which achieved relaxation of
tensions in east-west relations and strengthening of peace and security
system in multilateral fora must be applied globally. We hope that this new
spirit of international cooperation should be extended to Asia just as in
(31) http : //www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/gaiko/summit/houston90/j16_b.html (access
June 16, 2009)
(32) Alexander Panov, Fushinkara Shinraihe, (Tokyo, Simul Press, 1992), pp.
37-38
149(690)
Europe.”(33) Gorbachev later came up with a very positive evaluation of
Tokyo visit and London summit, expressing his conviction that had this
process been continued the territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet
Union would have been resolved soon.(34)
In July 1992, exactly the opposite situation has risen. This summit in
Munich was the first summit to greet the first President of the Russian
Federation, Boris Yeltsin. It was conducted at the height of Russian
rapprochement toward Japan in the spring to summer 1992. Yeltisn was a
proud leader who could not bear public humiliation. But he was greeted in
the Political Declaration with the following : “We welcome Russian
commitment that it would implement foreign policy based on the principle
of law and justice. We believe that this Russian commitment would
become the basis of complete Russian-Japanese normalization through the
resolution of territorial problem.”(35) Yeltsin took this G7 communiqué as
an affront and pressure against him, and this became one of the reasons of
the collapse of Russian policy toward Japan in September 1992 by the
cancellation of his trip to Japan.(36)
Senkaku/Dyaoyutai controversies
As analyzed above, present day situation around Senkaku has become
volatile. It may be premature to definitively judge that the Chinese
government has completely forsaken Dengʼs legacy to leave this issue out
(33) http : //www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/gaiko/summit/london91/j17_b.html (access,
June 16, 2009)
(34) Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev Kaisoroku, II, (Tokyo, Shinchosha, 1996), p.
329
(35) http : //www.mofa.go. jp/mofaj/gaiko/summit/munich92/j18_b.html (access,
June 16, 2009)
(36) Togo, The Inside Story, p. 172
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from the centrality of the relationship and to let the issue resolved by the
generations to follow. But clearly, there are signs that some political forces
in the government are advocating more assertive policy. On December 8
2008, two maritime research vessels navigated for nine hours through the
territorial waters of Senkaku, despite repeated warning to stay away by
the Japanese maritime agency.(37) On the same day, Deputy Chief of
Maritime Control Department of the State Maritime Agency stated that
“In a sea area where there is a conflict on international law, it is important
to show the presence in the jurisdictional area and accumulate effective
control.” Foreign Ministry spokesman told at the press conference on that
day, that “Dyaoyutai is an inherent territory of China, and there is no
reason for China to be intervened by another state. Whether to implement
a research activities or not, and when to do it, is Chinaʼs domestic matter.”
This issue has reportedly been seriously discussed at the top leaders
Meeting on December 13 in Fukuoka.(38) This incident on December 8,
2008 and the two public statements which followed cannot just be ignored
as a coincidence. So far the Japanese government position is markedly
tamed in contrast to this growing assertiveness by the Chinese
government. The policy of “no provocation” by virtually shutting out
Japanese citizensʼ access still seems to stand. But that situation is fraught
with volatility and danger.
The first and obvious approach, which may really be in need is that the
two governments begin to talk seriously the need to have some regulated
approach so as not to let the issue explode into real collision. The Japanese
side might explain that throughout the painful negotiations with the Soviet
Union and Russia, it has not resorted to any use of physical presence in the
(37) Sankei Shimbun, December 10, 2008
(38) Asahi Shimbun, December 14, 2008
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sea area. That pacifist approach was typical in post-war Japanese foreign
policy. But that approach helped to preserve peace in East Asia, however
serious Japanʼs territorial claim to Russia might have been. The Japanese
side should make it unambiguously clear that the only way to find a
mutually acceptable solution without risking the security situation is to
approach the territorial issue through negotiations, based on minimum
respect to the status quo. The negotiations need not be taken in a formal
manner, but there is an absolute need to talk, at least on the security risk of
the territorial issue.
If the Chinese government so desires, the Japanese government should
not back away from talking the sovereignty issue. The Gromyko approach
to insist that the territorial issue does not exist, therefore it is not willing to
talk, just froze the bilateral relationship. Shevardnadzeʼs approach to show
readiness to listen has been so instrumental to melt the ice between the
two countries. That lesson has to be learnt squarely.
Another area where scope of dialogue between the two governments is
opened is the area of joint projects on Senkaku without going into the
resolution of sovereignty issue. In fact, a possible joint economic activity on
Senkaku has already been proposed for three decades by the Chinese side
and not accepted by the Japanese side. After the conclusion of the Peace
and Friendship Treaty in 1978, Den Xiaoping raised this idea to Zenko
Suzuki on May 31, 1979. Suzuki was a LDP politician who was known to be
close to the then Prime Minister Ohira, and he later replaced Ohira in July
1980 upon Ohiraʼs sudden death. When Suzuki visited Deng in May 1979,
Deng, after explaining to Ohira historical Chinese position not to bring this
issue at the centrality of the relationship, proposed the following : “We
need to leave the [sovereignty] issue aside, and we may consider a joint
development of the resources in this area. First of all, both sides need to
stay away from propaganda ; both sides need to consult and implement
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joint development, and not to refer to the sovereignty. As for the
technology, naturally the Japanese side would supply.”(39) There is no sign
that the Japanese side showed any interest in Dengʼs idea. To the contrary,
on March 6-7, 2006, when it was reported that the Chinese side proposed a
joint development of the territorial waters around Senkaku islands within
the overall framework of joint development of East Sea energy sources, no
positive response seemed to have emerged through the Japanese press.(40)
It was later revealed that the area proposed by China was located just
North to the territorial waters around Senkaku, but that negative response
toward joint economic activities did not wane.(41) Thus when current
framework agreement on East Sea energy development was concluded
between the two sides on June 19, 2008, one of the newspapers wrote that
“It was a positive result of Japanese diplomacy that it could reject Chinaʼs
proposal for a joint development around Senkaku islands.”(42)
This issue of security, sovereignty and joint projects leading to
confidence building measures can be and should be taken up not only by
governments but also by academics, intellectuals and opinion leaders in
second track. Rich experience in Japan-Russia relations may give good
food for thought.
Takeshima/ Dokto controversies
One needs to consider seriously, why Takeshima issue began to occupy
such a weighty position in Japan-Korea relations. In a way it is puzzling for
many Japanese observers, because Korea, unlike Senkaku, is actually
(39) Urano, Senkakushoto, p. 248
(40) Asahi Shimbun, March 8-9, 2006
(41) Asahi Shimbun, March 11, 2006
(42) Sankei Shimbun, June 19, 2008
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occupying the islands ; Japan, who has been claiming the islands has put it
“on the shelf” and has long shown no intention to actually realize its
reversion, let alone to use any forces ; and recent developments which
exploded South Koreans were largely due to Japanese domestic measures
which did not have direct impact on the negotiations between the two
governments.
In such a situation one needs to give real thought why this issue has
occupied such an important place in bilateral relations. The first reason I
can think of is total lack of mutual understanding on what the issue means
for the other party. There is total lack of understanding on the Japanese
side, that Dokto issue is for the Koreans the most symbolic and
representative issue of Japanʼs colonization. Takeshimaʼs annexation to
Shimane prefecture in 1905 was a prelude to Tsushima naval victory
against Russia, Japanʼs enlarging its role as Korean colonizer, which
eventually led to its annexation in 1910. Any attempt by the GOJ to
explain, educate its people or propagate the existence of the territorial
issue and trying to justify its position is instinctively taken as an attempt to
justify Japanese colonial ruling. Conversely in Japan, very few people
perceive this issue as a symbol of Japanese colonization. As said, there is a
general understanding that the resolution of this issue was made taking
into account 35 years of Japanese colonization in its background, but to be
told that the issue itself is the most representative and symbolic issue of
Japanese colonization usually take many Japanese with a surprise. Korean
emotional reaction to defend Dokto militarily against possible Japanese
invasion usually put many Japanese with awkward feeling. What should be
done in that deep perceptional gap? To me the best and probably the only
way to overcome this gap is that the two sides would enter into a deeper
and better dialogue just to understand each other. Government officials
have no reason not to join this dialogue, but given the highly sensitive
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political nature of this issue, this dialogue should, at least in the coming
years when this issue still might become a boiling pot between the two
countries, be conducted exclusively within a framework of academic and
non-governmental format. It is not negotiations but a tenacious attempt to
improve better understanding.
The second approach one needs to think is a genuine confidence building
measures to avoid real security threat. As said, because the Japanese side
has currently no intension to claim back in real terms, or display Japanʼs
jurisdictional right over the islands with physical forces, in principle, the
territorial dispute should not develop into a real security danger. Still
jurisdictional claim sometimes might entail physical encountering. In April
2006, the two governments really faced a very serious situation when
physical collision between Japanese official research vessel and Korean
border guard vessels became within a real possibility. Korean government
had made public plans to propose renaming of seafloor topography near
Dokto islets at the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) in June
2006. Alerted by this move Japanese Maritime Safety Agency decided to
send its own research vessels around Takeshima to investigate the seafloor
topography so that it can make a counter proposal at the IHO. Korean
authority and media responded with the harshest alarm to this Japanese
counter-actions. At this point, physical collision between JMSAʼs research
vessels and Korean border guard vessels entered clearly in sight.(43) But on
April 21 and 22, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi and his
Korean counterpart held intensive talks in Seoul, and reached an
agreement that the Japanese side would withdraw its research vessel and
Korean side would not propose the renaming of Dokto islets seafloor
topography.(44) This incident left a serious lesson that some kind of
(43) Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 2006 ; Kyodo, April 30, 2006
(44) Kyodo, April 30, 2006
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confidence building measures or rule of the game to avoid physical collision
in any circumstances is highly desirable.
As to a precedent on confidence building measures on Takeshima/
Dokto, a commendable agreement on fishery which shelved the sover-
eignty issue and created a structure through which fishermen from both
countries might conduct their catch in the vicinity of disputed Takeshima/
Dokto was achieved. In November 1998 a new fishery agreement was
concluded and went into force in January 1999 after its ratification in
respective parliament. This treaty dealt with the Takeshima issue with a
pragmatic structure. Without naming the sea area around Takeshima by
name, it defined the area around the islands by mapping it.(45) It then
specified that in this area each country should retain its jurisdiction over
respective citizens. It also specified that each government is obligated to
take necessary measures so that its own fishery vessels should respect
conditions for the catch, respecting the recommendation given by the joint
fishery committee established by the two governments.(46) The treaty also
included a disclaimer that “Any article of this treaty shall not harm each
contracting partyʼs position on any issues of international law other than
the fishery.”(47) Thus the treaty created a structure to allow fishermen of
both countries to be engaged in catch at the area where they find catch to
be commercially viable. But in reality agreement was hardly reached in
the joint fishery committee and the Japanese fishermen began to claim that
they were virtually deprived of their fishing right.(48) Deeply discontented
fishermen apparently pressured the Shimane Prefecture to do something
about Takeshima, and this apparently led to the establishment of the
(45) Article 9-1 of the 1998 Fishery Treaty
(46) Appendix I-2 of the 1998 Fishery Treaty
(47) Article 15 of the 1998 Fishery Treaty
(48) http : //blog. livedoor. jp/lancer1/archives/50141003.html (access, June 16, 2009)
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Takeshima Day in Shimane in 2005. While frustration is mounting on the
part of Japanese fishermen, Constitutional verdict on February 26, 2009 at
the Korean Supreme Court gave judgment that the 1998 Fishery Treaty is
constitutionally lawful.(49) What are other key approaches to strengthen
confidence building measures around Takeshima/Dokto? Joint scientific
research or some joint cultural event? This issue may become the key
factor in dealing with these islands issue in the near future. Governments
naturally have a key role to play, but second track dialogue among
interested parties would have major role to contribute to this direction.
Conclusion
A paradoxical situation is emerging in Northeast Asia. Among the three
territorial negotiations in the region it was by far the Japan-Russia disputes
on the Northern territories that occupied the time and attention of the
negotiators. As the result of this enormous amount of time and energy
spent, Japan and Russia now find itself to manage the security danger
which the territorial divergence may create. In terms of peace and
security of the region this is a positive development. As for the two
remaining issues, Takeshima with Korea and Senkaku with China, both
issues were not at the centrality of Japanʼs respective policy toward Korea
and China. In case of Korea, since Japan was the claiming part to ask to
change the status quo, Japanʼs relatively reserved position should have
been a good ground to take the heat off from the bilateral relations. In case
of China Japan was long led to believe by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping
that China does not intend to bring this issue to the forefront of the
(49) http : //japanese. joins. com/article/article.php?aid=111937 (access, June 16,
2009)
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relationship. As it turned out to be, in the last decade or so, the Japanese
are slowly realizing that this self-intoxicating optimism may prove to be
wrong. Any Japanese move, even a relatively minor domestic one, in
accordance with Japanese perception, explodes the Koreans with highly
emotional militaristic reaction. An issue of seafloor topography runs the
risk of physical collision between the border guards and maritime security
vessels. Recent move by the Chinese authority gives some doubt that the
time of Zhou and Dengʼs legacy may be completely over. Three measures
can be realistically proposed to meet the challenges.
First, among scholars, researchers, academics, intellectuals, opinion
leaders, governmental officials in private capacities, there can and there
should be a real open and frank discussion on all aspects of the territorial
disputes. But this dialogue has to be conducted with a reciprocal spirit of
trying to understand other countries position : the basis of its logic, national
emotion behind, contemporary political forces, security risk and so on. A
third countryʼs individualsʼ involvement may prove to be useful, but it is
advised that it is done with caution and wisdom, because even on an
individual level, an overt support of one countryʼs position may run the risk
of emotionally provoking the other party. US individualsʼ involvement may
prove to be particularly useful, or dangerous, because both on Takeshima
and Senkaku, the U. S. has not been a complete outside party.
Second, it is high-time for the government officials to be a little more
courageous and initiative taking to create a framework through which
security danger may be avoided. It is almost axiomatic to argue that
physical collision has to be avoided at all costs. Non-governmental
individuals are well suited to throw out ideas within the context of overall
dialogue as mentioned above, but it is government task and responsibility
not to let territorial dispute developed into a security danger. For that
there is a need to establish a common rule of conduct and behavior.
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Third, as these two measures are reasonably well implemented, it may
become possible that experts, policy makers and opinion leaders may come
up with creative ideas where sovereignty issue is well shelved and
concrete ideas of cooperation and joint ventures might develop.
Strengthening of confidence building measures becomes the key factor.
The ultimate objective of sovereignty resolution may best be achieved
after the two countries have gone a certain stage of this mutual confidence
building.
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